San Jose Case Study Part Two: Light Rail
>
> Like San Diego, Portland, and St. Louis, San Jose jumped on the
> light-rail bandwagon in the early 1980s. It opened its first
> light-rail line in 1988 and has steadily, if slowly, expanded the
> system ever since. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta, who was
> San Jose's representative in Congress when the first light-rail lines
> were funded, is a big fan of light rail and promotes it in many other
> cities.
>
> Yet no reasonable person could look at San Jose's light-rail lines as
> an example of sound transportation planning. Not only does San Jose
> light rail contribute almost nothing to the region's transportation
> needs, its ridership is pathetic even by the standard of other U.S.
> light-rail lines.
>
> San Jose light-rail construction costs have not been excessive
> relative to other light-rail lines. But its low ridership means high
> operating costs per rider. These high costs are a major factor in a
> financial crisis that is facing San Jose's transit agency, the Santa
> Clara Valley Transportation Authority (VTA).
>
> History
>
> The Santa Clara County Transit District (now known as the Valley
> Transportation Authority or VTA) took over San Jose's privately owned
> bus lines in 1976. Armed with a permanent one-half cent sales tax,
> the agency rapidly expanded the region's bus service and doubled bus
> ridership in just three years.
>
> From the start, the agency was also enamored with light rail and
> began planning an extensive rail network. The 1983 environmental
> impact statement for the first light-rail line also considered
> busways, HOV lanes, and highway expansions as alternatives to light
> rail.
>
> The study showed that highways were by far the most efficient way to
> handle increased transportation demand. While the cost of light rail
> per new rider (that is, the cost of attracting someone out of their
> car) was estimated to be around $2 per ride, the cost of new roads
> diverting a car off of existing roads was estimated to be less than
> 10 cents per vehicle mile. Yet the road improvement alternatives were
> discarded.
>
> The study also estimated that a busway would cost less to build and
> attract more riders than light rail. But it also estimated that light
> rail would cost less to operate than buses. "Since the (operating)
> subsidies needed to supplement fares are paid out of local tax
> resources," said the plan, this difference in operating costs tilted
> the decision toward rail.
>
> For the cost of constructing its first light-rail line, the transit
> agency could have doubled the number of buses in its system. But then
> it would have to operate those buses, which it couldn't afford to do.
> Since federal and state funds were available only for capital costs,
> not operating costs, it elected to spend the maximum capital funds on
> projects that would pose the least operating cost. Of course, the
> reason why operating costs were low was that the project served only
> a tiny fraction of the region.
>
> In short, light-rail technology was selected for reasons other than
> efficiency or common sense. The effect on the transit agency's budget
> probably played the biggest role in the decision to choose light rail
> over roads or expanded bus service.
>
> Environmental impact reports for later light-rail lines did not
> seriously consider busway or highway improvements. They did, however,
> project significantly higher costs per new rides. Where the first
> line was estimated to cost around $2 per new ride, the second line,
> known as the Tasman Corridor, was projected to cost more than $40 per
> new ride. Capital costs of $42 million per mile, compared to less
> than $30 million per mile for the initial line, played only a small
> part of this cost hike. The main reasons for the increase appear to
> be more realistic estimates of operating costs and ridership.
>
> Phase one of the region's first light-rail line opened in 1988 and by
> 1992 it was 21 miles long. The 7.6-mile Tasman line opened in 1999
> and a 1.9-mile extension opened in 2001. With funding from another
> one-half cent sales tax approved in 1996, two more lines are expected
> to open in 2004.
>
> Ridership Falls Far Short of Projections
>
> The emphasis on light rail led the agency to forego further
> expansions to the bus system. As a result, transit ridership in 1987
> was actually lower than in 1982.
>
> Ridership grew over the next four years as phases 1 through 4 of the
> first light-rail line were opened in succession. By 1992, when the
> line was completed, ridership was 35 percent greater than before it
> opened. Since riders are counted twice when they board a bus and then
> transfer to rail, at least some of this increase was due to more
> transfers as the agency replaced downtown buses with buses to
> light-rail stations. But at least some of the increase was real.
>
> Success was short lived, however, as ridership immediately began to
> decline after 1992. Ridership fell so much in 1993 that the agency
> was forced to cut bus and rail service due to revenue shortfalls.
> While the number of rides began to rise again in 1996, passenger
> miles of travel have remained below 1992 levels in every year through
> 2000 except 1998. Moreover, light-rail ridership on the first line
> never exceeded half the riders projected in the original study.
>
> In 2000, Santa Clara County voters were persuaded to fund more
> light-rail lines as well as an extension of BART to San Jose.
> Proponents naturally claimed that rail transit would reduce regional
> congestion. In fact, transit in general, and light rail in
> particular, has an insignificant effect on congestion.
>
> When compared with other light-rail lines in the U.S., San Jose's
> light-rail vehicles appear to be running almost empty. On average,
> San Jose buses carry 9.2 people at any given time, which is about 86
> percent of the national average. But San Jose light-rail vehicles
> carry only 14.8 people at any given time, which is less than 57
> percent of the national average.
>
> Table One
> Passenger Miles Per Vehicle Mile
> Bus LRT
> San Jose 9.2 14.8
> National 10.7 26.1
> Source: 2000 National Transit Database
>
(http://www.ntdprogram.com/NTD/Profiles.nsf/Docs/2000All/$File/2000NationalP
rofile.pdf
> and
> http://www.ntdprogram.com/NTD/Profiles.nsf/2000+All/9013/$File/P9013.pdf).
>
> Another standard of comparison is the number of passenger miles
> carried per route mile of track. On average, U.S. light-rail lines
> carried 4,400 passenger miles per route mile per day in 2000.
>
> By this measure, the most productive light-rail system is in Boston,
> which carried 8,500 passenger miles per mile. The least productive is
> -- you guessed it -- San Jose's, which at 1,750 passenger miles per
> mile carried less than half the average and only about a fifth of
> Boston's level.
>
> Table Two
> Daily Passenger Miles Per Route Mile
> Boston 8,484
> St. Louis 7,681
> Los Angeles 6,977
> Portland 5,937
> San Diego 5,318
> Salt Lake City 4,536
> San Francisco 4,258
> Dallas 4,023
> New York 3,445
> Sacramento 3,065
> Baltimore 2,795
> Denver 2,762
> Pittsburgh 2,600
> Philadelphia 2,443
> Cleveland 2,196
> San Jose 1,749
> Source: National Transit Database 2000 (see the Rail.xls file in the
> 00Trnsit folder on the Vanishing Auto CD)
>
> San Jose light rail does not compare well with other forms of
> transportation either. The only rail transit that is less productive
> than San Jose's LRT are the poorly located tourist trolleys in
> Seattle, Memphis, and Kenosha. San Francisco cable cars and New
> Orleans tourist streetcars are both more productive than San Jose
> light rail. (The Hudson-Bergen light rail, which is also poorly
> patronized, opened in mid-2000 so adequate data are not yet available
> for comparison.)
>
> Table Three
> Daily Passenger Miles Per Route or Lane Mile
> San Jose freeways 29,950
> BART heavy rail 17,074
> San Jose expressways 4,300
> CalTrain commuter rail 3,372
> San Francisco cable cars 3,283
> New Orleans streetcars 2,265
> San Jose light rail 1,749
> Source: National Transit Database 2000 (see table two), Highway
> Statistics 2000 (table HM-72), Texas Transportation Institute (for
> expressway, aka "principle arterial," data).
>
> San Jose's original light-rail line cost about $25 million per mile
> in 1992 dollars (about $30 million in today's dollars). More recent
> lines cost or are projected to cost about $40 million a mile. These
> costs are for tracks in both directions, so must be cut in half to
> get the cost per route mile.
>
> For comparison, a lane mile of expressway costs about $2 to $3
> million; a lane mile of freeway costs about $5 to $10 million. Thus a
> route mile of San Jose light rail costs about one-and-a-half to four
> times as much as a freeway lane mile and five to ten times as much as
> an expressway lane mile. Since light rail carries far fewer
> passengers than freeways and expressways, it costs 12 to 70 times as
> much per passenger mile as expressways and freeways.
>
> Light rail's poor performance is reflected in transit's tiny market
> share of San Jose-area motorized transport. The Valley Transportation
> Authority claims that transit has a 2.7 percent share of the market
> for personal transportation, but it measures market share in terms of
> trips. Because transit is slower, auto trips average nearly three
> times the distance as transit trips, so in terms of passenger miles
> transit has a much smaller share.
>
> In 2000, transit carried just 1.0 percent of motorized passenger
> miles of travel in the San Jose area. Light rail carried about 17
> percent of transit passenger miles, so it carried 0.17 percent of
> total motorized passenger miles.
>
> High Operating Costs
>
> Light rail's low ridership is also reflected in high operating costs.
> According to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), most
> light-rail transit agencies spend less on operations and maintenance
> on light rail than on buses, whether measured per trip or per
> passenger mile. (The FTA formula leaves out significant maintenance
> costs, but we'll ignore that for now.)
>
> As shown in the table below, however, operating San Jose light rail
> costs more per trip and per passenger mile than San Jose buses. The
> table also shows that both bus and rail operating costs are
> significantly higher than the national averages. This is simply a
> reflection of low overall transit ridership in San Jose.
>
> Table Four
> Cost Per Trip and Passenger Mile
> Cost/Trip Cost/PM
> Bus LRT Bus LRT
> San Jose 3.85 4.82 1.02 1.07
> National 2.19 1.89 0.59 0.45
> Source: See table one.
>
> San Jose Congestion Increasing
>
> The Texas Transportation Institute, which has tracked urban
> congestion since 1982, says the amount of time the average San Jose
> commuter wastes sitting in traffic has more than tripled in the last
> two decades. The Institute estimates this congestion costs commuters
> a billion dollars a year, or more than $1,400 per commuter, and burns
> up nearly 90 million gallons of fuel per year.
>
> There is a good reason for the increase in congestion. Since 1982,
> the number of miles driven in the San Jose urban area has increased
> by more than 68 percent, but the number of road miles has increased
> by only 15 percent. The miles of freeway driving have increased by 50
> percent, but freeway lane miles have increased by only 18 percent.
>
> Light rail, which carries less than 0.2 percent of passenger miles of
> travel and virtually no freight, obviously does nothing to reduce
> this congestion. Yet the Valley Transportation Authority wants to
> devote 80 percent of the region's capital transportation funding to
> mass transit, most of which will go to build new light-rail lines and
> an extension of BART heavy rail to San Jose. Despite the obvious
> conflict of interest, the Valley Transportation Authority not only
> runs transit but does all transportation planning for Santa Clara
> County, so this is the direction San Jose is heading.
>
> Despite the agency's pretense at comprehensive transportation
> planning, it does not seriously consider road alternatives. The
> environmental impact report for a light-rail line currently under
> construction didn't bother to consider road expansion as an
> alternative because, it said, it "would not meet the goal of
> providing a viable alternative to the automobile." The fact that
> light rail has proven to be a non-viable alternative to the
> automobile didn't dissuade the agency from building the new line.
>
> The plan to spend 80 percent of capital funds on transit is supported
> by the Metropolitan Transportation Council, which is the metropolitan
> planning organization for the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose
> metropolitan areas. The council admits that spending 80 percent of
> its funds on transit will not boost transit's market share, which is
> about 4 percent in the region as a whole.
>
> The Valley Transportation Authority claims that its plans, if fully
> funded, will increase transit's share of Santa Clara County trips
> from 2.7 percent to 4.3 percent by 2020. Since auto trips are longer,
> this would be an increase from 1.0 to 1.6 percent of passenger miles
> of motorized travel.
>
> Automobile travel in the San Jose urbanized area has been growing at
> about 1.75 percent per year, and Valley Transportation conservatively
> predicts it will continue to grow by 1.2 percent per year over the
> next twenty years. This means that the congestion relief provided by
> increasing transit's share from 1.0 to 1.6 percent over twenty years
> would be exhausted by just four to six months growth in auto traffic.
>
> Transit Funding Crisis
>
> The transit agency's assumption of full funding is currently in
> jeopardy. The agency's long dependence on sales taxes leaves it
> highly vulnerable to recessions. The current recession has also
> caused a severe drop in ridership, particularly in light rail. Bus
> ridership in 2002 to date is 7 percent lower than in 2001 and
> light-rail ridership has fallen by 29 percent.
>
> As a result, the agency fears it will run out of cash by mid-2003.
> Even though voters approved a new sales tax in 2000, the agency
> estimates it will fall $6 billion short of its funding needs over the
> next twenty years.
>
> By an amazing coincidence, $6 billion is approximately the amount
> Valley Transportation wants to spend building BART and new light-rail
> lines. But rather than halt construction, the agency is cutting back
> on bus service.
>
> Service cuts are expected by April 1 at the latest even as the agency
> continues to build two new light-rail lines. If history is a guide,
> opening service on these two new lines will simply put the agency's
> operating budget further into the red.
>
> A December 6, 2002, memo from the agency's general manager to its
> board reveals that the agency is considering three alternatives, one
> of which would reduce bus service by 70 percent, eliminate weekend
> light-rail service, and cut weekday light-rail service by 10 percent.
> But none of the alternatives considered would halt or even slow
> construction of any light-rail lines.
>
> On top of that, Valley Transportation has proposed to sell several
> pieces of land that it had purchased for park-and-ride stations. It
> already sold one five-acre parcel to the City of San Jose for $8.5
> million, which a San Jose city councilor says was necessary "to meet
> payroll." The city plans to build subsidized housing on these parcels.
>
> Conclusions
>
> Light rail is an obsolete technology that doesn't really work
> anywhere. But it is especially unsuitable in post-automobile urban
> areas such as San Jose, whose jobs are spread throughout the area
> rather than concentrated in a downtown.
>
> San Jose made a major mistake in committing itself to such an
> inappropriate form of transit. It is compounding that mistake by
> continuing to build light rail even as congestion increases and funds
> run short to operate its transit services.
> _________________________________________________________
>
> Randal O'Toole The Thoreau Institute
> rot@ti.org http://www.ti.org
>
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>
> You can learn more about problems with rail transit by attending
> "Preserving the American Dream of Mobility and Homeownership," a
> national conference that will be held in Washington, DC, on February
> 23-25, 2003. For more information, see http://www.ti.org/amdream.html.
>
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> issues. Issue number 31, which was part one of the San Jose case
> study, is not yet posted; if you would like a copy, email rot@ti.org.